Markets as Optimal Voting Systems
• John Vandivier
This article demonstrates that markets are an optimized voting system. I argue:
- Markets maximize corrected voter expression
- Markets solve Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
- Further evidence economics is politics and vice versa.
- Allow voters to precisely express their desires.
- Allow voters to be weighted by their quality.
- USA: 2-party single-choice vote. Arguably the theoretically worst means of voter expression and weighting.
- Ranked voting allows voters to express ordinal preferences but not cardinal.
- Proportional methods allow voters to express cardinal preferences, but lack proper weighting.
- Transferable votes are a bit more expressive.
- Weighting by IQ would allows some distinction in the quality of voters, but it has problems such as exempting intensity of desire and grit.
- Weighting by payment allows integration of productivity information and expressive demand.
- Pareto-efficiency
- Unrestricted target space
- Universality: It must deterministically provide the same ranking each time voters' preferences are presented the same way
- Non-dictatorship. This is implicit to 2 but it is specially emphasized.
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives. This is a result from the combination of 2 and 3 but it is specially emphasized.