Markets as Optimal Voting Systems
• John Vandivier
This article demonstrates that markets are an optimized voting system. I argue:
- Markets maximize corrected voter expression
- Markets solve Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
- Further evidence economics is politics and vice versa.
- Allow voters to precisely express their desires.
- Allow voters to be weighted by their quality.
- USA: 2-party single-choice vote. Arguably the theoretically worst means of voter expression and weighting.
- Ranked voting allows voters to express ordinal preferences but not cardinal.
- Proportional methods allow voters to express cardinal preferences, but lack proper weighting.
- Transferable votes are a bit more expressive.
- Weighting by IQ would allows some distinction in the quality of voters, but it has problems such as exempting intensity of desire and grit.
- Weighting by payment allows integration of productivity information and expressive demand.
Notice that the market system overcomes Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which states that no voting system can obtain all of the following requirements:
- Pareto-efficiency
- Unrestricted target space
- Universality: It must deterministically provide the same ranking each time voters' preferences are presented the same way
- Non-dictatorship. This is implicit to 2 but it is specially emphasized.
- Independence of irrelevant alternatives. This is a result from the combination of 2 and 3 but it is specially emphasized.